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The future of jihad
What next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?
Tobias Feakin and Benedict Wilkinson
Over the past two years, Islamic State (ISIL) has expanded inexorably. In 2013, it carried out 350 terrorist attacks, killing 
1,400 people.1 And its rapid growth hasn’t abated since then: it now controls large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq 
and has, by one estimate, up to 31,000 fighters, of whom between 60% and 75% are ideologically committed core 
members.2 It also has access to significant financial resources: one analysis suggests that by mid-2014 ISIL was earning in 
the region of $2 million per day from sales of oil (although sanctions have probably diminished this);3 its kidnapping and 
extortion rackets are estimated to be worth between $35 million and $45 million;4 other funding streams, such as the 
sale of antiquities on the black market, are more difficult to assess but likely to be significant.5
Indeed, ISIL has grown to such a size that it can now be considered a quasi-government capable of producing laws, 
implementing policy, managing financial affairs and so on. Not surprisingly, many see it as both a local threat in the short 
term and a global one in the longer. Western politicians are clearly worried. In a statement delivered on the eve of 9/11, 
The image shows a Kalashnikov resting on rocks during a combat operation in the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan’s eastern Kunar Province. © Ed Darack/Science Faction/Corbis.
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US President Barack Obama described ISIL as ‘unique in [its] brutality’.6 Equally, in September 2014, Australian Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott referred to the ‘murderous rage of the ISIL death cult’.7 However, the rise of ISIL in Syria and especially Iraq took the world 
by surprise. The speed of its military success, which few terrorist groups of any ideological persuasion have previously matched, 
caught the international community off guard. Since the summer of 2014, governments have been playing catch-up in their 
understanding of the nature of the threat that the group presents and how to counteract it.
Barely a day goes by when ISIL isn’t in the news or there’s no new report detailing its activities, its adroit use of social media or 
the methods by which it recruits foreign and local fighters. In the midst of all this, al-Qaeda has not only been relatively quiet, 
but relatively forgotten: there’s a sense in which it has become the ‘moderate’ stream in an increasingly brutal, barbaric and 
bloodthirsty violent Islamist movement. While ISIL is arguably all those things, al-Qaeda’s resilience—and its tendency to be just as 
brutal, barbaric and bloodthirsty as ISIL—shouldn’t be forgotten. ISIL presents al-Qaeda with a real dilemma: the former continues 
to dominate the headlines, sucking up the ‘oxygen of publicity’ that terrorist groups need to survive; al-Qaeda’s in real danger of 
being not just overshadowed by a competitor, but priced out of the market entirely. In short, ISIL’s rapid rise poses an existential 
threat to al-Qaeda. Even al-Qaeda’s allies, such as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and the Egyptian and Malian iterations of Ansar 
al-Sharia, are turning to ISIL, proffering hands of friendship.
However, the related questions about what the rise of ISIL means for al-Qaeda and how will it react haven’t been asked. How will 
al-Qaeda seek to regain the oxygen of publicity that’s central to terrorist organisations if they’re to recruit, grow and, ultimately, 
challenge their enemies? Does the rise of ISIL signal the end of al-Qaeda or might al-Qaeda merge with ISIL, confront it head on or 
take some other course of action? This short paper focuses on all these questions.
The paper is in three parts:
• a history of the rise of ISIL and its relationship with al-Qaeda, focusing on the areas of tension and agreement as well as the 
links that particular violent Islamists have to both groups
• an analysis of the key characteristics that make ISIL a real threat and, arguably, the most dangerous terrorist group currently in 
operation
• based on the preceding analysis, four scenarios that describe how the relationship between al-Qaeda and ISIL might develop, 
and the ramifications of that development.
The growth of ISIL
The relationship between ISIL and al-Qaeda requires considerable untangling. In part, this is because ISIL’s jihadi ‘ancestry’ is 
convoluted and complex, riven with changes in name and leadership. In part, it’s because the history of the relationship is one of 
shifting attitudes and power relations between the two organisations. At the heart of the often antagonistic relationship between 
the two is a deeply entrenched disagreement over different strategic visions. For al-Qaeda, the jihad had to be internationalised 
and directed at the US and the West.8 For ISIL, territory in Iraq and Syria had to be occupied and ‘Islamised’; only by constructing 
the ‘true’ Islamic state (the caliphate, or khilafa), its logic runs, can the West be overthrown.
The relationship between ISIL and al-Qaeda requires 
considerable untangling. 
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Pledge: 2004–2006
The roots of these differences in strategic visions are to be found in ISIL’s jihadi ancestors. In 1999, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who 
would later rise to notoriety for the sheer barbarity he inflicted on Iraq’s Shia population through his campaign of beheadings 
and suicide attacks, established an organisation called Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). Although JTJ fitted into the wider jihadi 
ecosystem, it remained largely autonomous, and focused on undermining the Jordanian regime in the first instance and then 
establishing an Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. Osama Bin Laden attempted to bring JTJ under the broader al-Qaeda mantle in 1999 
and 2002, but was reported to have been rejected by al-Zarqawi. By 2004, however, al-Zarqawi was low on funding and financing; 
he recognised the opportunities, in terms of both resources and in jihadi prestige, offered by a coalition with al-Qaeda, now at the 
height of its powers. In 2004, after eight months of negotiations, JTJ was incorporated as a formal, full-blown al-Qaeda franchise 
under the moniker of al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, more popularly known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).9
And yet, although they were united under al-Qaeda’s black flag, the two organisations had fundamentally different ancestries, 
aims and strategic visions. Al-Qaeda Core (AQC) continued to look to attack the West, seeing the US and its allies as the hands that 
fed local ‘un-Islamic’ regimes and, by extension, the hands that needed to be severed for the caliphate to be established. AQI, by 
contrast, remained a far more local organisation, fixated on inciting a sectarian war between Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites as a way of 
further destabilising an already unstable Iraq.
Indeed, it was precisely this difference in strategic vision that put al-Zarqawi at loggerheads with AQC and its then deputy 
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The animosity between the two resulted in al-Zawahiri writing al-Zarqawi a now notorious letter that 
attempted to persuade him to avoid attacking the Shia population.10 Al-Zarqawi ignored the entreaties of al-Zawahiri: in November 
2005, AQI bombed three hotels in Amman, killing 59, most of them Muslims, some of whom had been at a wedding.11 A few months 
later, in February 2006, AQI launched attacks on the Askariya Shrine, one of the holiest in Shia Islam, destroying its golden dome 
and inciting massive protests.12
Autonomy through détente: 2006–2010
Against the backdrop of all this, al-Zarqawi brokered the formation of a coalition of jihadi organisations operating in Iraq under the 
name of Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (MSM) in January 2006. Al-Zarqawi’s logic was to create a broader coalition to stave off criticism 
of his campaign, but his death in a US air strike six months later had the potential to dissolve the nascent coalition. However, the 
AQI leadership moved quickly to appoint a replacement in the form of Abu Ayyub al-Masri. Under al-Masri’s leadership, AQI rode 
out the period of instability, consolidated its position and grew in confidence. Crucially, however, al-Masri never formally pledged 
his allegiance to Bin Laden or, by extension, to AQC. In contrast, when MSM changed its name to al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi Iraq 
(the Islamic State in Iraq, or ISI) a few months later, al-Masri immediately pledged allegiance (baya) to the leader of ISI, Abu Omar 
al-Baghdadi.13
It’s worth making two points here. First, even under the leadership of al-Zarqawi and certainly under the leadership of al-Masri, 
AQI was a far from obedient al-Qaeda franchise: orders were regularly ignored, particularly over the anti-Shia approach advocated 
by al-Zarqawi and al-Masri. Second, al-Zawahiri and AQC never recognised the beginnings of the breakaway in public. From 2006 
onwards, AQC continued to lay claim to ISI in public statements and may well have believed that ISI was simply being disobedient 
or that AQC’s messages weren’t reaching the leadership.
However, the absence of a formal pledge of allegiance to AQC by al-Masri spelled the beginning of the end of AQC’s ‘ownership’ 
of ISI. ISI became an increasingly independent entity, with its own leadership, strategic vision and narrative. Indeed, even the 
decision to declare the state was, according to Adam Gadahn, taken without consulting al-Qaeda’s core leadership.14 By claiming 
that ISI was under its control in public, but recognising its autonomy in private, AQC strategically had the worst of both worlds. 
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As ISI became more and more divorced from AQC, it targeted Shia communities even more brutally. Ultimately, this precipitated 
a massive backlash in the form of a US-funded group called Anbar’s Salvation (also known as the Sahwa movement).15 This not 
only severely restricted ISI’s capabilities, but also caused AQC considerable reputational damage. Al-Qaeda had no control over its 
unruly former ally, and yet was tarred with the same brush.
Split: 2010–2014
Very little changed after the death of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2010. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with his 
predecessor) became the leader of ISI and followed his namesake in refusing to swear allegiance to Bin Laden or, after Bin Laden’s 
death, to the new leader, al-Zawahiri. The absence of formal allegiance is a crucial signifier of the relationship between AQC and 
ISI: although both organisations operated in the same jihadi ecosystem and shared much in the way of ideology, ISI was not a 
subordinate to AQC, whatever the latter might have said in public. Indeed, the history of ISI–AQC relations at that time was one 
of respectful disobedience: ISI never formally disavowed al-Qaeda or critiqued its ideological position and strategic outlook; the 
leadership simply stated its own agendas and visions and pursued those regardless.
The period of respectful disobedience—in effect, as William McCants has argued, a détente—did not last long. Relations between 
the two organisations deteriorated rapidly after ISI extended its reach into Syria, changing its name as it did to ISIL. For AQC and its 
local Syrian franchise, Jabhat al-Nusra, this was a step too far. The situation wasn’t improved by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s assertion 
that ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra were one and the same. The claim provoked a verbal conflict between al-Baghdadi and Jabhat 
al-Nusra’s leader, Muhammad al-Joulani, in the first instance, and a military one between the two organisations that killed more 
than 3,000 people in a matter of months in the second.16 Al-Zawahiri, presumably reluctant to lend his weight to one side or the 
other, was slow to step in; when he eventually did so in January 2014, his intervention was widely perceived as timid 
and anodyne.17
Three men from the radical Islamist group al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda Iraq, in one of their headquarters in Deir Ezzor/Syria. On the left the Palestinian field commander Abu Ishaq, in the middle the 
regional commander, on the right the al-Nusra media activist “Steve”, photo dated 12 March 2013 © Benjamin Hiller/Corbis.
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As ISIL continued to make significant headway in both Iraq and Syria, occupying territory and acquiring the oilfields that could 
fund its vision of an Islamic state, its relationship with AQC became increasingly riven with animosity. By February 2014, Zawahiri 
had had enough: a statement was released bluntly erasing all ties between the two organisations: ‘ISIS is not a branch of the 
Qaidat al-Jihad group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and the group [al-Qaeda] is not responsible for its actions.’18 
By April, ISIL had shed the last vestiges of its once respectful attitude towards al-Qaeda: Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, ISIL’s 
spokesman, released a statement saying, ‘al-Qaeda today has ceased to be the base of jihad, rather its leadership has become an 
axe supporting the destruction of the project of the Islamic State and the coming caliphate …’.19
While AQC has overtly disavowed ISIL, other parts of the wider global jihadi movement, including al-Qaeda’s own 
semi-autonomous franchises, have done the exact opposite and have expressed their support for ISIL and even moved to pledge 
allegiance to it. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) declared its support for ISIL in August 2014, and it’s almost certain that 
ISIL members are operating in Yemen and that AQAP members are operating alongside ISIL in Iraq. Boko Haram, which has strong 
links with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to ISIL in March 2015. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, an organisation operating in Egypt’s Sinai 
desert, similarly pledged allegiance to ISIL in November 2014, going so far as to refer to itself as ‘Sinai Province’.
The threat of ISIL: recruitment, propaganda and finances
Although AQC didn’t formally split with ISIL until February 2014, the two organisations had never seen eye to eye. At best, theirs 
was a loose, but respectful, acknowledgement that they operated in similar environments—a characteristic of the broader jihadi 
movement; at worst, it was full-blown conflict and bloodshed. Underpinning this animosity was a genuine and longstanding 
difference in their strategic visions. For al-Qaeda, as its great strategic debates of the mid- and late 1990s suggest, the real targets 
are the ‘far enemies’ that support what it sees as puppet regimes on Islamic territory. Only by cutting off the hands that feed those 
regimes, so the logic runs, can a truly Islamic state be established. For ISIL, it’s about geography: territory has to be captured and 
coercively ‘Islamised’ by the strict and brutal application of sharia, largely involving targeting the local population, particularly the 
Shia population.
Until the meteoric rise of ISIL, al-Qaeda, its franchises and those autonomous adherents inspired by its ideology had been deemed 
the most significant terrorist threat to Western states’ security. However, ISIL has rapidly risen in its stead and is, without question, 
the most influential and powerful terrorist organisation currently operating. The threat that it poses is derived from three 
core characteristics:
• the organisation’s ability to recruit large numbers of international fighters to its cause
• its understanding of how to propagate a compelling social media propaganda campaign to draw and sustain support to its 
cause
• its ability to generate massive financial resources to arm, train and pay fighters and support its interpretation of state building.
While AQC has overtly disavowed ISIL, other parts of the wider global jihadi 
movement, including al-Qaeda’s own semi-autonomous franchises, have 
done the exact opposite and have expressed their support ....
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Recruitment of foreign fighters
According to most open-source estimates, a minimum of 20,000 people from at least 90 nations have travelled to Syria and Iraq 
to join extremist groups. Of those, it’s estimated that around 80% have joined ISIL, in which foreign fighters—including around 
3,700 Westerners—make up half of the fighting ranks. Most of the foreign fighters come from Arab nations, such as Tunisia (3,000), 
Saudi Arabia (2,500), Jordan (1,500) and Morocco (1,500); however, smaller contingents come from nations as far away as France 
(1,200), Belgium (440), Indonesia (60) and Australia (175).20 But these are the official numbers of those who are known about, and 
the real figures may well be much higher.
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has drawn in foreign fighters at a faster rate and in greater numbers than any past Middle Eastern 
conflict, including the Afghanistan war of the 1980s and recent US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 According to a report 
released by the UN in October, the speed at which people from outside Syria and Iraq are swarming into the territory is 
unprecedented: ‘numbers since 2010 are now many times the size of cumulative numbers of foreign terrorist fighters between 1990 
and 2010—and are growing.’22
Propaganda via social media—online Jihad 3.0
The past 15 years have seen higher and more diversified forms of online activity by violent Islamists. No more powerful example 
exists than the current media campaign by ISIL, which has largely outrun any government’s ability to keep up. Whether it’s ISIL’s 
well-oiled media machine, Al Hayat, or the social media feeding frenzy of its fighters and supporters, it has reached a broader 
audience than al-Qaeda managed in the past. It’s possible to point to three key stages of development in the online activity of 
al-Qaeda, its affiliates and now ISIL.
During the early to mid-2000s, the internet was a primary tool for planning operations and organising meetings between those 
involved in networks. A second evolution took place as the internet became a conduit for sermons and propaganda, and YouTube 
videos of jihadists in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan became easily available. AQAP is widely credited as being the pioneer 
for the way it disseminated its material to a global online audience through its magazine, Inspire. AQAP’s charismatic figurehead, 
Anwar al-Awlaki, was famed for his English-language YouTube sermons, blog and Facebook page, which influenced various people 
to carry out acts of terrorism.23
We’ve now reached a third stage in the evolution of modern jihadist propaganda, which a New York Times article named ‘online 
Jihad 3.0’. A photo shared by pro-ISIL Twitter users shows three bullets, each with a different top: ‘A bullet. A pen. A thumb drive … 
There is a different form of jihad’.24 ISIL members have pursued the last of these with vigour: they’re part of the ‘digital age’, having 
grown up with technology, and have become adroit at using the entire range of disseminating tools at their disposal.
JustPaste is used to publish summaries of battles that have taken place, SoundCloud to release audio reports of activities, 
WhatsApp and Kik Messenger to communicate and send images and videos, and Instagram, Facebook and Twitter to share 
images, propaganda and messages from the front lines. On Twitter, ISIL uses ‘twitter bombs’ to redirect trending hashtags to 
Twitter content and websites related to ISIL. The group also uses ‘twitter bots’ that repeatedly post the same content several 
times a day along with popular hashtags such as #worldcup2014 to ensure that references to ISIL trend highly, ensuring that its 
messages—designed to both intimidate and inspire—reach the broadest possible audience. One analyst, tracking the mentions 
of ISIL on Twitter in February 2014, found that ISIL registered more than 10,000 mentions of its hashtag per day.25 There are even 
Q&A sessions on Ask.FM about joining the group, the logistics involved and what it’s like to be on the front lines. ISIL’s messages 
are tailored to its audiences, changing depending on whether they’re intended for a local audience or for would-be Western 
recruits. What it has managed to do is to bring the battlefield, its gore, and the thrill of fighting into the bedrooms of millions in a 
way unparalleled in the past. One thing’s for sure—ISIL’s rapid battlefield success, wealth and claims of a caliphate have been an 
intoxicating blend for those considering joining.
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Generating funds
Al-Qaeda depended mainly upon funding from benefactors, beginning with Bin Laden himself and extending to a global network 
of sympathisers. Its affiliates have gained financially through similar means, as well as kidnapping for ransom, extortion and a 
range of other criminal activities. At its peak, al-Qaeda’s financial network was estimated to be worth around US$300 million.26 
ISIL has managed to transform itself from a group that was mainly reliant on wealthy Persian Gulf donors to one that’s largely 
self-sustaining, with financial resources estimated to be as high as US$2 billion, far outweighing al-Qaeda’s financial muscle.27
US intelligence estimates that, at its peak, ISIL was earning more than US$3 million per day from oil resources, looting, kidnapping, 
human trafficking, smuggling and the taxation of populations that it occupied. Before the US-led airstrikes, ISIL had control 
of twelve or so oilfields in Syria and Iraq (with an estimated production capacity of more than 150,000 barrels per day). Oil 
from the fields is smuggled across the borders and sold on the black market in Syria, Turkey, the Kurdistan region of Iraq and, 
potentially, Iran.28
Following its battlefield successes and occupation of various cities, most notably Mosul, ISIL has looted banks, museums and 
businesses to extract currency and valuable antiquities that are sold in regional black markets. Millions more are made from 
ransoms paid for kidnapped people, even though there’s been a recent shift towards executions of kidnapped international 
members of the media and non-government organisations. The sale of women and children as slaves has added millions to the 
group’s finances, and taxes on people in ISIL-controlled areas is a rich source of funding, especially when extracted under pain of 
death. It’s estimated that ISIL was benefiting to the tune of $8 million per month from this form of extortion in Mosul alone.29
Being such a cash-rich organisation means that ISIL can afford to acquire new weapons on the black market, supplementing those 
it has acquired from retreating Iraqi forces. It also means that it can maintain large numbers of frontline fighters and make financial 
donations to the families of those who die while fighting for it. ISIL’s financial autonomy means that targeting its financial resources 
is pivotal to reducing its capacity to fight and recruit, and should be an absolute priority in lowering its appeal and suppressing its 
strongholds in Syria and Iraq.
What international terrorist threat does ISIL present?
ISIL has devoted a great deal of its efforts to trying to build an Islamic state, or caliphate. It has called on Muslims from across 
the globe to join its ranks and assist in fighting to build and expand the borders of that state. Since August 2014, there has been 
a concerning flow of Islamist groups announcing support for, or pledging allegiance to ISIL. Some have come from various small 
splinter groups which have attempted to use the ISIL brand to gain additional support for their own organisations, yet in recent 
times we have seen Boko Haram, al-Murabitoun, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Ansar al-Islam pledge allegiance to ISIL. In total there 
are 34 confirmed Islamist groups that have moved their support from al-Qaeda to ISIL and appears to illustrate a shift away from 
al-Qaeda’s traditionally dominant sphere of influence.30
Rather than adopting a strategy of directly targeting Western nations, as al-Qaeda does, ISIL has wanted to build a caliphate as 
a basis for strengthening its organisation, ideology and finances. Despite this apparently inward-looking focus, there’s no doubt 
ISIL has managed to transform itself from a group that was mainly reliant 
on wealthy Persian Gulf donors to one that’s largely self-sustaining, with 
financial resources estimated to be as high as US$2 billion, far outweighing 
al-Qaeda’s financial muscle.
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that beyond its ‘state building’ phase ISIL presents a threat to Western nations, as al-Baghdadi’s globalist ambitions have never 
been hidden. With the onset of coalition air strikes, ISIL has begun to ramp up its focus on Western nations. Attacks in Canada 
and Belgium and foiled plots in Australia, France, the UK and elsewhere illustrate the growing internationalism of the group. ISIL’s 
chief spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, has increasingly called for attacks on the West and the defeat of both Washington 
and Rome.31
Clearly, the numbers of foreign fighters being drawn into ISIL’s ranks are of great concern to many national governments, which 
worry about the likelihood of battle-hardened foreign fighters returning to their countries of residence and conducting violent 
attacks on civilian populations. This is of most concern in countries that have contributed many fighters to ISIL, such as Tunisia, 
Morocco, Libya and Indonesia, and have weak domestic security forces. The appeal of ISIL’s ideology is outweighing that of 
al-Qaeda and is stretching many states’ policy mechanisms for dealing with that ideology and the group’s recruitment.
ISIL hasn’t, so far, utilised networked terrorist cells to carry out large-scale attacks in Western nations, as al-Qaeda did. Instead, it 
has pushed for its supporters to carry out attacks using low-level weaponry in their own countries and to film the attacks to 
promote ISIL and draw more supporters to its cause. Although the former director of the US National Counterterrorism Center, 
Matthew Olsen, has argued that ISIL has no cells in the US, and that it ‘is not al Qaeda pre-9/11’, degrading the group’s capability 
now is a prudent approach.32 It’s likely that ISIL will continue to push for international attacks by its followers, especially as it 
comes under increasing pressure from air strikes in Iraq and Syria. While the West should expect isolated incidents of this type, the 
direct threat that ISIL poses to those countries geographically close to its centre of gravity is far greater. Significant numbers of 
foreign fighters from Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Morocco and Indonesia have been drawn into ISIL’s ranks. Those countries have less 
mature counterterrorism mechanisms and need international support to strengthen their ability to cope with the spread of violent 
extremist ideology and the repercussions of fighters returning home.
In this undated file photo posted on 27 August 2014 by the Raqqa Media Center of the Islamic State group, fighters of the Islamic State wave the group’s flag from a damaged display of a government fighter jet 
following the battle for the Tabqa air base, in Raqqa, Syria. © AP via AAP.
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Al-Qaeda and ISIL — Four Alternative Futures
ISIL poses a genuine threat to security in the Middle East and Western countries. It has sophisticated modes of recruitment, 
significant funding and a loyal following in the West. Indeed, it’s arguably the most threatening terrorist group currently 
in operation. However, while ISIL threatens regional and Western security, it also threatens al-Qaeda. ISIL has become the 
‘organisation of choice’ for aspiring jihadis. With each terrorist act, it dominates the headlines, sucking up the oxygen of publicity 
that’s so vital to terrorist organisations. It has overtaken al-Qaeda and become the ‘go to’ organisation—the one that would-be 
jihadis invariably seek to join. In this sense, al-Qaeda’s being outmanoeuvred and outplayed at its own game, losing the manpower 
and military means that it needs to achieve its political ambitions.
For al-Qaeda, something has to give if it’s to survive. Based on the available evidence, there are four potential scenarios for 
al-Qaeda’s response:
• Status quo: uneasy bedfellows
Al-Qaeda has only limited human and financial resources; its adherents in Europe are essentially autonomous and lie beyond 
the reach and control of al-Zawahiri and the historical leadership of AQC. The franchises in Yemen, North Africa, Indonesia 
and India remain semi-autonomous, but are equally deprived of the capability to launch international attacks of the type to 
recapture the imagination and support of aspiring jihadis. Direct confrontation with ISIL isn’t feasible, not least because it 
would cause further schisms in the global jihadi movement and alienate the remnants of al-Qaeda’s support base. Left with 
little option other than to muddle through in the hope that ISIL is a flash in the pan rather than the resilient organisation that 
al-Qaeda has proven itself to be, AQC elects for an uneasy stance of tolerating ISIL, neither supporting nor opposing it. In short, 
rather than seeking to challenge ISIL ideologically or militarily, al-Qaeda accommodates ISIL as an uneasy bedfellow in the 
wider global jihadi movement.
• Merger: putting differences aside
AQC recognises that its ability to conduct spectacular attacks is currently diminished, and that it doesn’t have sufficient 
resources to achieve its political objectives. Rather than seeking to recapture the imagination of its supporters and increase 
recruitment, it seeks a formal alliance with ISIL. In joining forces, al-Zawahiri must put to one side the abiding differences 
between the two groups’ strategic visions by forming a pact with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the merger leads to wider sharing and 
pooling of resources and exchanges of fighters for specific operations and helps to build a genuinely global jihadi alliance. In 
Iraq and Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIL put aside their differences and fight for a common cause, while the wider al-Qaeda 
movement continues to pursue its internationalist agenda.
• Wither: the failure of confrontation
Al-Qaeda seeks to regain the limelight and the support of the wider jihadi movement by confronting ISIL directly, both militarily 
through Jabhat al-Nusra and reputationally through its media channels. However, its efforts fail: ISIL is more adept in its media 
campaign and has sufficient military resources to counter Jabhat al-Nusra. Al-Qaeda loses precious financial and military 
...while ISIL threatens regional and Western security, it also threatens 
al-Qaeda.
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resources, compounding failure. Continued attempts to rectify the situation result in yet further losses and, as the movement 
attenuates, members increasingly defect to ISIL. Over time, al-Qaeda loses its identity before becoming effectively defunct as 
its remaining members flock to ISIL.
• A spectacular attack: a game of one-upmanship
Al-Qaeda channels some of its remaining resources into a spectacular centrally organised and funded attack. If successful, the 
attack allows it to regain the headlines and experience a surge in popularity, reputation and, ultimately, recruitment. Having 
recaptured the limelight, al-Qaeda plots further attacks of a similar magnitude using its new-found resources. As al-Qaeda 
slowly becomes the terrorist group of choice for aspiring jihadis, members of ISIL begin to defect to the more internationalist 
and globally organised al-Qaeda. ISIL, recognising that it’s losing ground to a rejuvenated al-Qaeda, plots significant attacks in 
an effort to regalvanise the organisation and hold on to its recruits. As its attacks succeed, it recaptures the imagination of its 
supporters and experiences increased recruitment and popularity. This game of one-upmanship—of repeated efforts to outdo 
each other in any combination of the magnitude, frequency and targets of terrorist activity—drives each party to increase the 
ferocity of its campaigns.
All four options are feasible. However, the key factor in determining al-Qaeda’s response to the rise of ISIL is the human, military 
and financial resources that it has at its disposal. If al-Qaeda has sufficient resources to survive, but not to expand or confront ISIL, 
then it’s likely to muddle through, underpinned by its historically strong semi-autonomous franchises in Yemen and North Africa. 
If, on the other hand, al-Qaeda’s senior leadership recognises that its resources are all but depleted, then it’s likely to pursue some 
form of an alliance with ISIL. If it miscalculates both its own strength and that of ISIL, there’s likely to be more entrenched and 
direct confrontation between the two organisations.
 Fighters from al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate al-Nusra Front drive in the northern Syrian city of Aleppo flying Islamist flags as they head to a frontline, on 26 May 2015. AFP PHOTO / AMC / FADI AL-HALABI via AAP.
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The first three options are marginally less likely than the final—and most worrying—scenario, in which al-Qaeda pursues a 
campaign of international attacks in order to regain the limelight. There are a number of reasons for this. First, al-Qaeda has, 
throughout its long and bloody history, shown itself to be a resilient organisation, remarkably adept in exploiting weaknesses in its 
political environment. Second, while al-Qaeda has been significantly challenged by ISIL, it has shown, not least in Yemen and North 
Africa, that it still has a loyal following and can still perpetrate significant acts of terrorist violence. Third, al-Qaeda has historically 
been at its most dangerous when the international community has taken its eye off the ball: in 2000, opportunities were missed to 
dismantle the nascent organisation, which responded with the attacks of 9/11. Similarly, in 2005, AQAP was all but defeated, but 
Western governments turned their attention elsewhere and allowed the organisation to re-establish itself. Ten years later, and 
AQAP is the most threatening of al-Qaeda’s franchises.
This leads us to make a single policy recommendation.
ISIL is a real threat and must be targeted, but al-Qaeda shouldn’t be forgotten. Indeed, al-Qaeda should remain a key focus for 
international counterterrorism efforts. It’s a resilient and resolute terrorist organisation, but it’s also weaker than it’s been for 
many years. We should use this brief opportunity to dismantle the organisation completely.
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